Inscribing the Other Body by Yegenoglu, Meyda
Four Danish women write.
Their title is “The Freedom to Wear a
Veil”.
That the veiled Muslim woman by all
means should be regarded as oppressed is a
myth that ought to be killed. Muslim
women’s voice is not heard in this matter
and they claim that the veil represents free-
dom and dignity and they do not perceive
the veil as inhibiting or oppressive. Quite
the contrary: For them the veil guarantees
her the full respect of the surroundings and
thus must be considered a privilege rather
than a burden. But women wearing veils
radiate devotion towards their religion.
They have chosen the veil as a clear demon-
stration of their Muslim identity. For the
Muslim woman, the veil represents free-
dom. Only this freedom has another cha-
racter and expresses itself in another way
than that of the West. But must the women
of the West be the only ones to define free-





How do we perceive the veiled 
Muslim woman? A way of trans-
gressing the positions for or against
the veil is debating the discourse of
Enlightenment.
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Muslimer i københavn demonstrerede i dag mod forslaget om at forbyde religiøs hovedbeklædning. 
Foto: POLFOTO/Jens Dige
what the right to choose for oneself and to
decide over one’s own body means? […]
Of course, every woman must have the




Batool, 21 years old, and Ayisha 19 years
old. They challenge the idea that woman
are forced to wear the veil. Scarf con-
tributes to creating equality between man
and woman. For Batool this prevents her
from being seen only as a sex symbol. She
says she feels more protected and secure as
problems like sexual harassment and rape
are avoided. Bergliot Emine, a Norwegian
convert, says “Muslim women have more
freedom than women in the West. The veil
allows me to walk around without being
judged by my appearance. 
(http://www.themodernreligion.com/wome
n/w_hijab_dane.htm)
The editorial of the Qantara News: The
Muslim Magazine (January 2004) referring
to the French government’s plan to ban the
hijab in public schools reads as follows:
President Jacques Chirac claims that this is
about “conspicuous” religious symbols in-
cluding Jewish skullcaps, turbans and large
crucifixes, but let’s face it – the dispute into
which it has stepped is about the headscarf
[…] Mr. Chirac, a Christian wearing a cross
is not analogous to a Sikh wearing a tur-
ban, a Muslim wearing a scarf or a Jew
wearing a skullcap. To observant Muslims,
Jews and Sikhs, however, head coverings
are obligations. Their observance therefore,
falls under the rubric of freedom of expres-
sion and conscience, not, as you, would
have it, proselytism (gentle convert) […] A
Muslim woman, more often than not,
wears the hijab because it is a spiritual ex-
pression of her values. Hijab […] for Mus-
lim women marks their identity and pub-
licly declare their faith. In the face of rising
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Islamophobia, it may even be considered an
act of resistance. Can hijab be used by
some as a form of oppression? Yes, it can
be. While we condemn France, we must al-
so censure the governments of Tunisia,
Turkey and other nations who have also
taken legal measures to block free religious
expression. We question societies where the
hijab is imposed in coercive ways. We know
this debate isn’t over a headscarf. It’s about
faith, the value of freedom and the conse-
quences of expression. And if we think that
resolution of the French controversy will be




The predominantly Muslim demonstrators
carrying banners that read “My veil, my
voice” or “Veil, cross, kippa, leave us the
choice.”
(http://www.masnet.org/news.asp?id=773)
Fatima Bociha, whose head and neck were
covered with a brown scarf, housewife and
mother of two from a town of West of Paris
said: Liberty, equality, fraternity – apart
from women who wear the veil,” “The
French state wants us to submit, to tell us
what to wear and what not to wear,” she
added. “None of these women here will
take their veils off.”
(http://www.masnet.org/news.asp?id=773)
Djamila Bekioui, who wore a head scarf in
the colors of the French flag, said: “We are
being undressed. We have no more free-
dom. We feel that we are considered sec-
ond-class citizens.”
(http://www.masnet.org/news.asp?id=773)
Marchers were furious about a report com-
missioned by Chirac suggesting that some
Muslim women are forced to wear head
scarves by male relatives or to avoid being
insulted by men in public, reports the AP.
Jacques Chirac: “Most French people saw
“something aggressive” in the veil and that
the secular state could not tolerate “osten-
tatious signs of religious proselytism”.
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/
0,11882,1101321,00.html)
The French president’s comments followed
a petition published by 60 prominent
French women, including the actors Is-
abelle Adjani and Emmanuelle Beart and
the designer Sonia Rykiel, published in the
French edition of Elle. They call for an out-
right ban on “this visible symbol of the
submission of women”. The petition states:
“it is an intolerable discrimination against
women” and a law is needed to reinforce
the principle of a “lay” republic. 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/
0,11882,1101321,00.html)
Mr. Chirac stressed that he had no dispute
with the vast majority of French Muslims,
but added: “Wearing a veil, whether we
want it or not, is a sort of aggression that is
difficult for us to accept.” A clear majority
of both the public and MPs favour a ban,
believing that it is the only effective way to
defend France’s secular republic from the
demands of militant Islam. 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/
0,11882,1101321,00.html)
Saida Kada, co-author of a book defending
hijab says: “Headscarf wearing is a religious
matter that has nothing to do with politics,
but is one of the rules of the Islamic faith.
Hijab was being used as a pretext to paper




French philosopher Elisabeth Badinter sees
headscarfs as a threat to equality for wo-
men.: “If we allow women to wear head-
scarves in state schools, then the republic
and French democracy have made clear
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their religious tolerance but they have giv-




One fear is that if headscarves are allowed
eventually fundamentalist male Islamists
will start punishing any girls and women
who do not wear them.
Muslim student Teycir Ben Naser: “I dis-
agree with the proposed ban. I’m in
France, I’m in a country that proclaims lib-
erty and human rights and is forcing some-
one to take off the hijab.” 
(http://www.parapundit.com/archives/200
3_12.html)
Egyptian filmmaker Safaa Fathy: “The
French government is attempting to prevent
the growing radicalization of Arab and
Turkish Muslims who live in suburban areas.
There, the young girls of only eight years




The Islamic scholar and journalist Navid
Kermani: “The French law is very radical,
yet it doesn’t mean unequal treatment for
religions. In fact, it bans all religious sym-
bols from schools. In Germany, the explicit
aim is to only remove Islamic religious
symbols from the classroom. In my opin-




Sebnem Bahadir, a researcher in the area of
intercultural communication at the Johan-
nes Gutenberg University in Mains: “The
French law limits women’s right to person-
al freedom. […] The headscarf is not only a





The Moroccan writer Tahar Ben Jellou,
who lives in Paris:
The debate about the headscarf in France is
not about taking away Muslim women’s
right to choose the way they dress. Not at
all, it is about a particular dress code for
public society. The headscarf is, to my
mind, the triumph of ignorance. The law of
laicism is very important. Several genera-
tions of the French have fought for its im-
plementation in 1905. I am very much op-





Qantara editorial reads: “For the founders
of the Turkish Republic, France’s secular-
ism functioned as a role model; and conse-
quently, no one in Turkey is surprised that
the French now want to ban the headscarf
from their schools. “
(http://qantara.de/webcom/show_article.p
hp/_c-549/_nr-12/_p-1/i/html)
In Turkey, the officially stated goal is to
produce “enlightened, educated Turkish
women”. Kemalists argued that the “The
West was victorious because we Muslims
were stagnating” and they pointed to the




In Britain, the Foreign Office Minister
Mike O’Brien: “The British government
supported the right of all people to display
religious symbols. In Britain we are com-
fortable with the expression of religion.” 
(http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_ar-
INSCRIBING THE OTHER BODY 59
ticle.php/_c-549/_nr-11/_p-1/i.html?PH-
PSESSID=5869)
London’s Mayor Ken Livingstone was most
outspoken about the issue, going as far as
implying that France’s political elite is play-
ing into the hands of fascist ideologists. On
a recent protest march against the ban, Liv-
ingstone said: “President Jacques Chirac is
playing a terribly, terribly dangerous game
in the same way that many politicians felt
they could pander to Hitler in the 20s. It
(i.e. the ban) is an anti-Muslim measure




Abeer Pharaon, president of the Muslim
Women Society in Britain: “Despite the en-
couraging statements we have heard from
the Government, we remain extremely con-
cerned that the rapid spread of this legisla-
tion throughout Europe might encourage
extremists and Fascists to attack and insult
Muslim women in the UK. The hijab is our




Wearing the hijab is not a threat to anyone
and does not violate anyone else’s rights
and freedoms,” said Thomson. “Banning
the hijab cannot be viewed as necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals or for the protection of




Above all, the modern age is evident in the
veil and headscarf’s modern functions. In
addition to the religious relevance of the
veil and the headscarf has cultural, political
and social relevance. Inwardly, within
Egyptian, Syrian or Turkish society, they
symbolise the claim to justice, a justice be-
tween the classes and between the sexes.
This is an aspect that is all to easily over-
looked in the West. “Islamic clothing” for
men and women liberates its wearers from
the pressure of having to compete (hope-
lessly) with people like themselves by wear-
ing expensive clothes, cosmetics and jew-
ellery.
At the same time, it liberates them exter-
nally from a social origin that could possi-
bly be considered oppressive. Furthermore,
such clothing helps women and girls to
make their way in the world of education
and work by allowing them to exist in a
nimbus of sexual unassailability in a public
life that is still dominated by men. From a
functional point of view, therefore, it is in-
deed possible to see the headscarf as the ex-
act opposite of an openly-demonstrative
backward attitude, namely as a modern at-
tribute. At the same time, the headscarf re-
mains multifunctional: it is used both as a
tool by fathers to deny their daughters
higher education and by daughters to





Najla Ainouz, a 25 year old Moroccan im-
migrant to Denmark, was fired from her
job at the Føtex supermarket for wearing a
hijab headscarf in violation of an employ-
ment contract that forbids workers from
displaying any religious symbols and also
forbids really dramatic hair colors and nose
rings. Her union sued the supermarket but
Denmark’s high court ruled against Ainouz
and her union. 
(http://www.parapundit.com/archives/001
861.html)
Queen Margrethe of Denmark has spoken
out against radical Islam and called on
Muslim immigrants in the country to im-
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prove their Danish language skills. The
queen said, that “people had to take the
“challenge” of Islam seriously. We have let
this issue float around for too long, because
we are tolerant and rather lazy. Muslims
should learn Danish properly, so they
would not feel excluded from society.”
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
4445579.stm)
In the book Margrethe, written by journal-
ist Annelise Bistrup, the queen is quoted as
voicing disapproval of “these people for
whom religion is their entire life”. Calling
for opposition to radical Islam, she said:
“We have to run the risk of being labelled
in an unflattering way, because there are




Turkey, 1920s: Mustafa Kemal, the founder
of Turkish Republic, issued reforms about
women’s dress and men’s hat which were
considered as the most visible and outward
indicators of one’s allegiance to “civilized”
West or “barbaric” East. The goal was to
construct modern Turkish identity as op-
posed to backward Ottoman identity, make
Turkey a civilized/modern nation and yet
retain the native/original culture, to de-es-
tablish Islam and limit its power to matters
of belief and worship. The unveiling of
woman was a practical medium to signify
all these issues at once. For Kemal, the
practice of veiling was a particularly back-
ward practice and thus he targeted it as an
issue needing immediate “remedy.” The
regulation of the existing codes of dressing
was an indispensable element in Kemal’s at-
tempt for modernization.
Algeria under colonization: The colonial
administration in Algeria insisted on unveil-
ing women, for the veil was seen as the
concrete manifestation of the colonized’s
resistance to an imposed reciprocity.
Women’s insistence on wearing the veil
meant the colony’s resistance to being col-
onized. 
The campaign against the veil was intensi-
fied in the 1930s with the French adminis-
tration’s campaign to encourage the educa-
tion of women. In May 13, 1958, a group
of colonial generals accomplished a coup
and displaced the civilian governor of Alge-
ria. The same day, they organized a rally in
front of the Governor’s Palace and featured
the unveiling of a group of Algerian
women. The staging of such a performance
was meant to symbolize the conquest of
the last but foremost obstacle in the total
capitulation of Algerian culture. Such a per-
formance was supposed to symbolize that
“the whole of Algerian society was offering
itself, naked and willingly, to the embrace
of the European society” (Bourdieu 1961).
For the FLN, women were the true
guardians of their authentic traditions and
identity. Algerian nationalists were general-
ly in favor of emancipation, but they also
insisted that women in their traditionalist
role had preserved the native traditions and
what they wanted was a free Algerian not a
free French woman.
Turkey, 1999: Merve Kavakci, a women
wearing headscarf, was elected as an M.P in
the 1999 elections from Istanbul but later
she was banned from running office for five
years because her citizenship was revoked
and she was accused of instigating hatred
amongst people and striving to destroy the
laic structure of the Turkish state. Kavakç›
says: “Laic states like France and Turkey
can easily be defied if they claim to be both
democratic and adherents to values of hu-
man rights – which is the case in both of
these countries. The caveat with such a sys-
tem is its proclivity towards a tyrannical
reign like anti-religious fascism.”
(http://www.insideout.org/documentaries/
britishjihad/images/qNewsJanuary.pdf) 
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The debate over the veil has been either an
issue of freedom and dignity, devotion to
religion, a demonstration of one’s religious
and cultural identity. It has also been
framed as an issue of whether one feels
more secure and protected with the veil
and whether Muslim/veiled women have
more freedom than unveiled/Western
women. It is seen as a right to choose and
part of freedom of expression and con-
science and an expression of one’s spiritual
values. It is even seen as an act of resistance
in the wake of rising Islamophobia. It is
part of freedom of religious expression. Its
prohibition has been debated as a matter of
religious intolerance and discrimination.
The question of liberty and human rights
are the terms that govern the above posi-
tion.
Or the veil is seen as inhibiting and op-
pressive; as something imposed on women
in a coercive way and so it is regarded as a
visible symbol of women’s submission and
an undisputable sign of the discrimination
against women. Moreover, it is regarded as
an attack on secularism by the demands of
militant Islamism. A sign of backwardness
and resistance to modernization and civi-
lization. It is regarded as an indication of
triumph of ignorance as it is claimed that it
attempts to step back from laicism. As
women are forced to wear it, it limits their
rights and freedom to choose.
The characterizing features of the preva-
lent discourses on the veil in today’s Euro-
pean public sphere as well as in colonial
times are a by-product of the articulation of
elements of liberal humanism, feminist in-
dividualism and the principles of the En-
lightenment project. These discourses in-
scribe the issue of the veil within the terms
of the right and freedom of choice. Veiling
or unveiling, depending on one’s political
allegiance, becomes either an issue of libe-
ration and a right to decide and personal
freedom. Or a sign of oppression and lack
of freedom in individual liberties. But what
is common to both the anti-veil and pro-
veil position is the notion of a free individ-
ual, making rational choices about herself.
So, despite the apparent dissimilarity be-
tween the two positions, they do share the
same universe as both positions are based
on the same modernist notion of the indi-
vidual and body. This modernist notion of
the individual, who aspires to be free, ratio-
nal and liberated, is one of the fundamental
values valorized by the liberal ideology that
is fashioned by the Enlightenment project.
Enlightenment marks the constitution of
the subject, human and individual. What is
seriously missing from the discussions of
the veil in the European public sphere is an
understanding, which sees such cultural, re-
ligious practices as ways of inscribing
women’s bodies in particular ways.
I would like to suggest that, if we remain
within the terms of this liberal, Enlighten-
ment rhetoric, we will remain blind to the
inscription of bodies through various prac-
tices of adornment, clothing, cosmetics and
so on. In other words, what I am suggest-
ing is that, we need to free our discussion
of veiling from the terms of liberal ideolo-
gy, which cannot comprehend the veil oth-
er than within the problematic of free
choice versus oppression/imposition.
Therefore, the veil has to be liberated from
this liberalist dilemma and needs to be seen
as a practice of embodiment.
How can we think of the veil and em-
bodiment together? Can we read veiling
simply as an instrument of oppression? Or
should we conceive of veiling and unveiling
in terms of the bodily affects such practices
imply? How should we conceptualize the
relation between discourses, practices,
norms about dressing and the embodi-
ment? What kind of an understanding of
body can enable us understand corporeality
in culturally and sexually specific terms and
in their concrete specificities? What kind of
presumptions about subjectivity and body
need to be scrutinized and challenged so as
to posit the bodily roots of subjectivity? 
Feminist theory provided fruitful discus-
KVINDER, KØN & FORSKNING NR. 4 200662
sions for liberating the body from the grips
of the metaphysics. In these discussions
emphasis is placed upon the need for a ma-
terialist conception of the body and for the
embodied nature of subjectivity and sexual
difference. Those who emphasize the use-
fulness of poststructuralism for feminist
theory and the need for understanding the
body as an effect of historically specific
technologies of power offer fruitful hori-
zons to think the veil differently. Michel
Foucault’s analysis shows how the body
does not stand in an external relation to
power, but is marked, stamped, invested,
acted upon, inscribed and cultivated by his-
torically contingent nexus of power/dis-
course, that is, how it is brought into being
by power. Following Foucault, we can sug-
gest that power is the productive principle
through which the materiality of the sub-
ject is constituted. Such a constitution takes
place through processes of training, shap-
ing, cultivation and investment of the body
by power. Power takes the body as its tar-
get, the object, the medium to extract in-
formation so as to transform, remake, re-
inscribe and subject it to the functioning of
power. However, the subjection and con-
trol of the body within the field of power
must not be understood through a model
of repression. The Foucauldian approach
challenges the understanding of subjection
of the body to power as a simple process of
subordination or as a repression of its de-
sires and instincts. Following the Fou-
cauldian insight we can suggest that, “this
‘subjection’, or assujettisement, is not only a
subordination but a securing and maintain-
ing, a putting in place of a subject, that is,
subjectification. Therefore, the formation
and regulation of bodies in their materiality
cannot be understood separately from their
subjectification, for subjectification implies
a simultaneous creative and coercive
process. A useful force only if it is both a
productive body and a subjected body.
(Foucault 1977).
Understanding power as a productive
and formative process requires questioning
the presumptions of the paradigms, which
conceive the subject in terms of the prima-
cy of mind and the concomitant assump-
tion of the body’s naturalness and pre-cul-
tural status. Bodies are not ahistorical, pre-
cultural or pre-social: They are in no way
natural, but always-already marked, in-
scribed and engraved by social practices. In
emphasizing that bodies cannot be ade-
quately understood if they are seen as im-
pregnable by cultural, social, and historical
factors, we should underline the fact that
power produces bodies always as a determi-
nate type; bodies are neither universal nor
neutral, but always culturally, sexually,
racially specific. To liberate the body from
its colonization by the paradigms which
privilege the mind in understandings of
subjectivity will not only enable us to posit
its materiality, but also foster an under-
standing of bodies in their sexual, cultural
and racial specificities. Raising the question
of the specificity of the body requires simul-
taneously raising the question of its materi-
ality, for questions regarding the differ-
ences between bodies can only be meaning-
fully asked if the corporeality of bodies is
no longer seen as a biological, natural and
neutral, but always as a product, an effect
of power relations which constitutes them
in their specificities.
To be able to develop a materialist con-
ception of the body, the body as an affect
of power/knowledge nexus, we need to
formulate theories that have the force and
capacity to overcome the various dualisms
through which the body is traditionally en-
visioned. Among the most pertinent oppo-
sitions that need to be displaced for explor-
ing and developing an understanding the
body other than the one offered by tradi-
tional philosophical and phallogocentric
understanding are the body-mind, nature-
culture, and discourse-referent. To argue
for the constituted nature of the body does
not imply that the effectivity of discourses
on the body should be seen as limited to
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the shaping and influencing of the mind,
for such an understanding implies that
there is a biological, natural, real, material
body on the one hand, and there are vari-
ous cultural and historical representations
of it. The controlling, making and marking
of the bodies are not realized through the
control of ideas. Such inscriptions are not
merely added to a body that is naturally
and biologically given. If a materialist no-
tion of corporeality implies that power op-
erates by constituting the subject’s biologi-
cal make-up, then positing the body’s natu-
ralness as prior to its inscription needs to be
seen as an effect of power. The notion of a
biological or natural body is the very dis-
course, which neutralizes and universalizes
the cultural, racial, sexual specificity of dif-
ferent bodies. In fact such a universalizing
and neutralizing gesture is the gesture of
phallogocentricism, which preempts the
embodied nature of masculine subject, a
gesture that conflates the human with mas-
culine and thus marks women as the site of
embodiment. 
The notion of the body as the stuff of in-
scription of social norms, practices and val-
ues can be extended to the discussion of
veiling and the positioning of Muslim
women’s bodies within various representa-
tions. We can bring a different perspective
to the taken-for-granted presumption
about the cruelty and primitiveness of veil-
ing when we recognize the possibility of in-
scription of bodies through various prac-
tices of adornment, clothing, cosmetics and
so on. If veiling can be seen as a specific
practice of marking and disciplining the
body in accordance with cultural require-
ments, so can unveiling. In other words, both
the practice of veiling and unveiling are cul-
turally specific procedures of corporeal in-
scriptions, conditioned by specific cultural
histories. What needs to be examined here is
the presumption of the truth and natural-
ness of the unveiled body that the prevalent
anti-veil discourse is predicated upon.
However, if veiling is a specific practice of
situating the body within the prevailing exi-
gencies of power, so is unveiling. There-
fore, the unveiled body is no less marked or
inscribed; rather a whole battery of discipli-
nary techniques and practices has produced
unveiled women’s bodies and therefore
not-to-veil needs to be seen as one among
many practices of corporeal inscriptions. In
other words, there is nothing natural about
unveiling and therefore not-to-veil is no
less inscriptive than being veiled. Not-to-
veil, like veiling, is another way of turning
the flesh into a particular type of body.
However, the body that is not veiled is tak-
en as the norm for specifying a general,
cross-culturally valid notion of what a femi-
nine body is and must be. Hence the pre-
sumption of the naturalness of not-to-be-
veiled has come to secure the truth of bod-
ies and is used as the universal norm to
yield Muslim woman as a knowable and
comprehensible entity. In other words, it is
the naturalness and truth of the unveiled
body, which legitimates and endorses colo-
nialist sentiments and certitude in the ne-
cessity of interventionist actions against
Muslim women’s veiling. Moreover, the
beliefs and values about not veiling are no
less incorporated to the existential, embod-
ied being of unveiled women, the specifici-
ty of this inscription is effaced in colonialist
representations and the beliefs and values
that codify and mark unveiled women’s
bodies have come to secure the truth of
Western women’s bodies in general. They
are used as the explanatory norm to unravel
the desires and pleasures of bodies that are
located in other histories and cultures: one
culture’s codings of bodies become the
template through which all bodies are con-
jured. Veiling is one of those practices that
irritates and disturbs the Western especially
in feminist cognizance; it is one of those
practices, like incision and various other
body markings that incite anxiety. Practices
and processes by which other bodies are
marked have appeared to the Western eye
to be excessively violent, barbaric and as
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the indisputable document of cruelty Mus-
lim women are subjected to. The discipli-
nary techniques and procedures that in-
scribe, control and train other-Muslim bod-
ies are distinguished from the “civilized”,
Western techniques and practices by the
degree of barbarism inflicted upon the for-
mer. Emphasizing the culturally specific na-
ture of embodiment reveals, however, that
the power exercised upon bodies by veiling
is no more cruel or barbaric than the con-
trol, supervision, training, constraining
bodies by other practices, such as bras,
stilettos, heels, corsets, cosmetics and so
on. 
If bodies are produced through various
cultural practices, then their desires, pains
and pleasures must be specific to particular
cultures. If this is so, then the truth of
veiled women and their bodies cannot easi-
ly be retrieved within the terms of the colo-
nialist discourse, for it is a discourse which
is already a cultural product, enabled and
conditioned by dominant discourses. The
foreignness of the veiled body is assumed
to be deciphered by being translated and
neutralized within an economy of universal
truth.
The body is the medium through which
power operates and functions and knowl-
edge is the major instrument power utilizes
for this operation. It is also through the ex-
ercise of power that knowledge from bod-
ies can be extracted, and this knowledge in
turn functions as the main instrument in
the control, inscription and training of
bodies. Following Foucault on the issue of
power/knowledge nexus, we can suggest
that power and knowledge are the condi-
tion of existence of each other. Power is
transformed, altered, modified, intensified
in accordance with the diversification and
alterations in the order of knowledges. By
conceptualizing the interlocking of bodies
and discursive regimes, Foucault enables us
to understand the process of subject consti-
tution in modern society. As a body subject
to modern, colonial technology of power-
knowledge, the colonized should be pro-
duced as a new body and mind with certain
skills, characteristics and form; she/he
needs to be re-made. But to understand
this re-mapping and re-territorialization,
we need to position the body of the other
within a frame, which can account for it as
a historical and cultural effect of power.
The other’s particular mode of corporeality
is an important site for colonial inscriptions
of power, as the desire to get hold of the
native women’s body is evoked as the
metaphor of colonial occupation (hence
French colonialism’s obsession with unveil-
ing the Algerian women). If veiling is one
of the instruments of coding the Muslim
women’s body and her embodied nature of
subjectivity, then what bodily implications
might unveiling have for these women?
The following quotation from Frantz
Fanon is worth citing here as he describes
the bodily transformations an Algerian
woman undergoes when she is unveiled:
The body of the young Algerian woman
in traditional society is revealed to her by
its coming to maturity and by the veil. The
veil covers the body and disciplines it, tem-
pers it, at the very time when it experiences
its phase of greatest effervescence. The veil
protects, reassures, isolates. One must have
heard the confessions of Algerian woman
or have analyzed the dream content of cer-
tain recently unveiled women to appreciate
the importance of the veil for the body of
the woman. Without the veil she has an im-
pression of her body being cut up into bits,
put adrift; the limbs seem to lengthen in-
definitely. When the Algerian woman has to
cross a street, for a long time she commits
errors of judgment as to the exact distance
to be negotiated. The unveiled body seems
to escape, to dissolve. She has an impres-
sion of being improperly dressed, even of
being naked. She experiences a sense of in-
completeness with great intensity. She has
the anxious feeling that something is unfin-
ished, and along with this a frightful sensa-
tion of disintegrating. The absence of the veil
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distorts the Algerian woman’s corporeal pat-
tern. She quickly has to invent new dimen-
sions for her body, new means of muscular
control. She has to create for herself an atti-
tude of unveiled-woman-outside. She must
overcome all timidity, all awkwardness […]
and at the same time be careful not to over-
do it, not to attract notice to herself. 
The Algerian woman who walks stark naked
into the European city relearns her body, re-es-
tablishes it in a totally revolutionary fashion.
(Fanon 1965; emphasis mine)
Fanon draws our attention to one of the
most striking instances of the cultural vio-
lence of colonialism. He also suggests that
the veil is not simply an attire that covers
the woman’s body, but it is what trans-
forms a little girl into a woman in Muslim
society. It is because her mature female
body is made by the veil that unveiling her
is not simply an uncovering, or change of
dress, but peeling her skin off. In this sense,
the so-called dream hallucinations which
she experiences are very real sensations
which have parallels in the everyday, “nor-
mal” experiences of crossing a street or
simply walking out in the street. As Kaja
Silverman (1986) notes, clothing, (and
veiling should be seen as one particular
style among many) has the force of consti-
tuting identity and corporeality: 
Clothing exercises as profoundly deter-
mining an influence upon living, breathing
bodies […] affecting contours, weight,
muscle development, posture movement
and libidinal circulation. Dress is one of the
most important cultural implements for ar-
ticulating and territorializing human corpo-
reality – for mapping its erotogenic zones
and for affixing a sexual identity (ibid.). 
Following Silverman, then we can see
the veil as not something that is external to
the identity of Muslim women, but as a
fundamental piece conjoined with the em-
bodied subjectivity of Muslim woman. If
we cannot comfortably assume that her
body is inside the veil or the veil is some-
thing that is outside of her body and hence
does not function merely as a body cover,
can we then think of bringing this body
outside the veil (as colonial or imperial
feminism desires) without at the same time
exercising another form of power? If the
veil is part of her body, part of her being-in-
the world, then it differs from a simple cov-
er that has an inside and an outside; its
“function” cannot be captured by such cat-
egorical oppositions. As the in-between of
outside and inside, the veil makes both in-
side and outside possible. There would in-
deed be no inside-outside without the veil.
It is what constructs a before and a behind.
But there would also be no veil without the
inside and outside that it makes possible by
separating and constructing. In the am-
biguous position it occupies, the veil is not
outside the woman’s body. Nor is she the
interior that needs to be protected or pene-
trated. Her body is not simply the inside of
the veil: it is of it; “she” is constituted in (and
by) the fabric-ation of the veil. Being an un-
decidable textile, the veil interweaves the
woman’s skin with its threads; as the sign
of fusion it stitches together the epidermis
of woman with cultural codings. It is both
her identity and her difference, or it is what
makes her identity different. The veil is that
which produces woman, or difference; it is
spacing, differánce.
By assuming an interiority that is con-
cealed by the veil, colonial gesture articu-
lates itself in terms of the Western meta-
physical or philosophical oppositions be-
tween origin and representation, essence
and appearance, identity and difference. A
number of writers have pointed to the fun-
damental continuity and homology be-
tween the structure of Western metaphysics
and phallocentric order. There is thus a
fundamental affinity or a chain of equiva-
lence among Western philosophical, colo-
nial and patriarchal discourses. This implies
that any serious challenge to patriarchy can-
not overlook questions of colonial dis-
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course, for both are placed within a larger
cultural project whose fundamental philo-
sophical assumptions need to be ques-
tioned. To assume that these questions are
separate from each other is the very illusion
that the categorical-analytic discourse of
Reason produces. A feminist discourse
which tries to emancipate others should in
the first place learn how to question this
very process of othering, and what this im-
plies for its “own” “identity” (that is to say,
whether a discourse can be both a discourse
of identity and sameness under the gover-
nance of Reason and Progress and a femi-
nist one at the same time). Such a ques-
tioning should of course include the ques-
tioning of the very opposition between in-
side and outside as one of the fundamental
cultural oppositions, which construct femi-
ninity itself. 
The veil is dress, but a dress, which we
might consider as articulating the very
identity of Muslim women. Only if we see
the veiling of woman in Muslim culture as
a unique cultural experience, then we can
actually learn about what it is to veil or un-
veil as woman, rather than simply re-setting
the liberal scene and repeating common-
sensical and cliché standards in the name of
universal emancipation. I want to argue
here that such commonsensical and cliché
standards may not be so commonsensical
and cliché after all. They may, on the con-
trary, be part of a colonial gesture that is
hard to define as colonial because, especial-
ly in a now de-colonized world, it articu-
lates itself as a universal, and politically and
morally correct task. 
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